Previous experiments have found mixed results on whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation. Here we add to this literature by building on prior work of Capraro (2017a). We report a large study (N=1,297) manipulating time pressure vs time delay in a sender-receiver deception game. We find that, in this setting, people are more honest under time pressure, and that this result is not driven by confounds presents in earlier work.
Introduction
Whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation is a current topic of debate. Two early studies using time constraints to manipulate cognitive mode found that honesty requires deliberation (Gunia et al, 2012; Shalvi et al, 2012 ). This conclusion was challenged by three more recent studies, two of which found the opposite effect, that time pressure promotes honesty (Capraro, 2017a; Lohse et al, 2018) , while the third one found a null effect (Barcelo & Capraro, 2017) . Studies using different cognitive mode manipulations, such as conceptual priming of intuition (Cappelen et al, 2013) , ego-depletion (Gino, Schweitzer, Mead & Ariely, 2011) , and cognitive load (van't Veer, Stel & van Beest, 2014 ) also led to mixed results.
Here, we add further evidence on this issue. We do by building on the prior work of Capraro (2017a) , who introduced a novel experimental lying paradigm by modifying Gneezy's (2005) sender-receiver game. In this experiment, subjects are told that they will be randomly assigned to either Group 1 or Group 2 and that they will have to choose between two possible strategies: "telling the number of the group they are assigned to" or "telling the number of the other group". If they will report the true number of the group they are assigned to, then both the decision maker and a randomly selected subject will get $0.10; otherwise the decision maker will get $0.20 and the other subject will get $0.09. Critically, subjects are not initially told the number of the group they are assigned to. This piece of information is provided directly in the decision screen. Here, half of the subjects are asked to make a decision within 5 seconds (time pressure); while the other half are asked to think carefully for at least 30 seconds before making a decision (time delay). Since the number of the group is not initially provided, the payoff maximizing strategynot reporting the true number of their group -is not immediately accessible. Capraro (2017a) found that, in this context, time pressure promotes truth-telling and used this finding to support the hypothesis that honesty is intuitive.
However, a closer look at the design reveals that it contains an important confound that could in principle invalidate the conclusions. It could be that time pressure just makes people more likely to report whatever number they are presented with, because that number is more immediately accessible. This could explain the pattern of results in the prior experiment even if honesty was not actually intuitive.
Here we test this alternative explanation by employing a modified design in which we vary whether subjects are shown the number of their own group or the number of the group of another subject. We conduct a 2x2 experiment where, along with a cognitive mode manipulation (time pressure vs time delay), we also vary the number presented (own group shown vs other group shown). If honesty is really intuitive, then time pressure should increase honesty in both the "own group shown" and "other group shown" condition. If, alternatively, it is just that time pressure makes people write down whatever number is presented to them, then there will be an interaction between time pressure and group shown, such that people under time pressure are more honest in the "own group shown" condition and less honest in "other group shown". To summarize, we pit against each other the following two hypotheses.
Intuitive Honesty Hypothesis. Time pressure increases honesty regardless of whether subjects are shown their own or the other subject's group number.
Alternative Hypothesis. Time pressure increases honesty in the "own group shown" condition, but increases dishonesty in the "other group shown" condition.
Experimental design and procedure

Protocol
We collected data in two sessions. In the first session, all subjects initially read the same set of instructions, in which they were informed that they had been paired with another anonymous subject, that there were two groups, Group 1 and Group 2, and that they will be randomly assigned to either of these groups, whereas the subject they had been matched with will be assigned to the other group. Subjects were also informed that their job was to report the number of the group they were assigned to and that payoffs would be determined as follows: if they report the number of the group they are assigned to, then they earn $0.10 and the other subject earns $0.10; if they report the number of the other group, then they earn $0.15 and the other subject earns $0.05. (We also changed the payoffs for lying, in order to avoid another potential source of confound in Capraro (2017a) , that subjects lied to increase social welfare (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004) .) After these general instructions, subjects were asked two comprehension questions, one regarding the choice that maximizes their payoff, and one regarding the choice that maximizes the other subject's payoff. Subjects failing either or both comprehension questions were automatically excluded from the survey. Subjects who passed this attention check were randomly divided in 8 conditions. In the Pressure_You_Assigned_1 condition, subjects were told they were assigned to Group 1 and were asked to report the group they were assigned to within 5 seconds. A timer was shown to pressure the subjects. However, subjects could take as long as they wanted to decide. Responses were collected using a blank box. The condition Pressure_You_Assigned_2 was similar, but this time subjects were assigned to Group 2. In the condition Pressure_Other_Assigned_1 subjects were told that the other subject was assigned to Group 1. Similarly, in the condition Pressure_Other_Assigned_2 subjects were informed that the other subject was assigned to Group 2. Finally, the conditions Delay_You_Assigned_1, Delay_You_Assigned_2, Delay_Other_Assigned_1, and Delay_Other_Assigned_2 were similar to the four "pressure" conditions with the difference that this time subjects were asked to think carefully for at least 30 seconds before making a choice. The button to submit the choice appeared after 30 seconds, so subjects were not allowed to submit their choice before. Thus, in all "You_Assigned" conditions the dishonest but payoff maximizing choice was to report a number different than the one displayed, while in all "Other_Assigned" conditions the payoff maximizing choice was to report the number displayed.
After making their decision, subjects entered a standard demographic questionnaire, at the end of which they were provided with a completion code, with which they could claim for their payment. After the experiment was ended, bonuses were computed and paid on top of the participation fee ($0.50). The "other subjects" were selected at random from the same sample. That is, each participant received a bonus both from their choice as decision maker, and from being in the role of "other subject" for a different participant (when making their decisions, participants were not informed that they would also be in the "other subject" role to avoid having this affect their choice). Verbatim instructions are reported in the Appendix. The second session was similar, but we added a standard Dictator game at the beginning of the survey, and we asked the demographic questions between the Dictator game and the Deception game, in order to minimize contagion effects. Here we analyze only the data on the Deception game.
Subjects
Subjects, living in the US at the time of the experiments, were recruited using the online labor market Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT). AMT experiments are easy and cheap to implement, because subjects participate from their homes to an online incentivized survey that takes no more than a few minutes. This allows experimenters to decrease the stakes at hand without compromising the quality of the results. Numerous studies have indeed shown that data gathered using AMT are of no less quality than data collected on the standard physical lab (Arechar, Molleman & Gächter, 2018; Brañas-Garza, Capraro & Rascón-Ramírez, 2018; Goodman, Cryder & Cheema, 2013; Horton, Rand & Zechkauser, 2011; Paolacci, Chandler & Ipeirotis, 2010) .
Results
A total of 1,297 subjects (mean age = 36.3, female = 48.1%) passed the comprehension questions and participated in our experiment (653 in the first session and 644 in the second session). As a first step, we analyze both sessions together. Linear regression predicting Honesty as a function of Time Pressure (1 if the subject participated in one of the time pressure conditions, 0 otherwise) and Other Group Shown (1 if the subject was shown the group of the other subject, 0 if the subject was shown their own group) find that both these variables have a significant positive effect on honesty (Table 1 , Column (1)). These positive effects are robust after controlling for sex, age, and education (Table 1 , Column (2)). Interestingly, adding these demographic variables also reveal a marginally positive effect of gender, such that females tend to be more honest than males. In sum, subjects under time pressure are more honest than those acting under time delay, and subjects who are shown the group of the other subject are more honest than those who are shown their own group.
Next we test our main research question. In Column (3) and Column (4) we repeat the previous linear regressions by adding the interaction term Time Pressure X Other Group Shown, without and with control on demographic characteristics, respectively. Note that the Alternative Hypothesis predicts that the interaction term is significant and negative (and sufficiently large to yield a significant negative net effect of time pressure on the Other Group Shown condition), while the Intuitive Honesty Hypothesis predicts that the interaction term is not significant and close to zero. As can be seen in Table 1 , the interaction term is not significant (p=0.231). Furthermore, if we split the sample by whether subjects were shown their own group or the group of the other subject, we find a positive effect of time pressure on honesty in both conditions, albeit only statistically significant in the Own Group Shown condition ( Thus, we did not find support for the key predictions of the Alternative Hypothesis: the negative interaction is not statistically significant, and the simple effect of time pressure in the Other Group Shown condition is positive rather than negative (although not significant). To bolster interpretation of the non-significant negative interaction, we used simulations to conduct a power analysis, which showed that our sample size would detect a difference in time pressure effects of 11 percentage points at the p=.05 level, and 9 percentage points at the p=.10 level. Given that the positive effect of time pressure in the Own Group Shown condition was 9.4 percentage points, we were sufficiently powered to detect an interaction that was large enough to reverse the sign of the time pressure effect (i.e. that was greater than 9.4 percentage points), and very well powered to detect an interaction of the size predicted by the Alternative Hypothesis (whereby the time pressure effect in the Other Group Shown condition was as large as that of the Own Group Shown condition, just in the opposite direction -i.e. a -9.4 percentage point effect, yielding a difference in time pressure effects of 18.8 percentage points).
Finally, we note that repeating all the analyses using logistic regression instead of linear regression, or conducting multi-level models that allow slopes and intercepts to vary across the two rounds of data collection yielded qualitatively equivalent results.
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Discussion
Whether honesty is intuitive or requires deliberation has attracted considerable attention in the last decade. Several experiments have tried to tackle this question, finding mixed results. Here we have focused on one particular experimental paradigm, introduced by Capraro (2017a), which found honesty to be intuitive. The original experiment by Capraro (2017a) contains an important confound that can potentially invalidate the interpretation of its results in terms of intuitive honesty. Since subjects are shown their group number and have only five seconds to report it either truthfully or not, it might be the case that subjects under time pressure are more likely to report whatever number is shown, not because of intuitive honesty, but simply because that number is more readily accessible.
Here, we have improved Capraro's (2017a) experimental design in such a way to tell the Intuitive Honesty Hypothesis apart from this Alternative Hypothesis. Our results are clearly inconsistent with the deflationary hypothesis that pressure just makes people report whatever number is shown, because pressure does not decrease honesty when subjects are shown the other's group number. In fact, we found no interaction between time pressure and group shown, suggesting that the effect of time pressure is similar when one's own group shown and when the other's group is shown, as predicted by the Intuitive Honesty Hypothesis.
However, a closer look at the results has also highlighted some intriguing potential differences between the "own group shown" and the "other group shown" conditions. Although the interaction between time pressure and group number shown is not significant, there seems to be almost no effect of pressure on honesty when subjects are shown the other person's group. Why the time pressure effect seems to decrease when the other group is shown is not entirely clear at this stage of the research. However, we can advance some hypotheses. First of all, we can rule out the hypothesis that our effect is explained entirely by time pressure making people more likely to report the number of the group that is presented to them. If it was the case, average honesty in the "other group shown" condition should be lower than the average honesty in the "own group shown" condition. This prediction is not reflected in the data, which are actually trending in the opposite direction. This leads us to a potential explanation. We find it surprising, and certainly we did not predict it, that honesty is significantly higher when subjects are shown the other participant's group number than when they are shown their own. One potential explanation for this result is that being shown the other person's group makes it salient that lying hurts the other person and thus makes people more honest in general. It is possible that this effect contributes to the lack of an effect of time pressure on honesty in the "other group shown" condition through at least two different paths. Perhaps, people under time delay become even more aware of the fact that lying would hurt another person, and thus become less likely to lie. Another possibility is that there is a ceiling effect: since honesty is higher in the Other Group Shown condition, there is less room for statistical changes. In any case, we believe that this is an interesting route for future research.
As a side, but still interesting, result, we have also found that men are more likely than women to lie. Gender differences in deception has been largely debated since the early paper by Dreber and Johannesson (2008) , which reported that men lie more than women in self-serving situations. Since then, numerous experiments have explored gender differences in (dis)honesty, finding mixed results (Biziou-van-Pol et al, 2015; Cappelen et al, 2013; Childs, 2012; Erat & Gneezy, 2012; Friesen & Gangaradhan, 2012) . Two recent meta-analyses shed light on this question: one of experiments using the die-under-cup paradigm (Abeler, Nosenzo & Raymond, in press ) and one of experiments using the sender-receiver game (Capraro, 2017b) , both found that men lie more than women. Our results are in line with these meta-analyses.
In sum, our results support the conclusion of Capraro (2017a) that time pressure increases honesty in the sender-receiver game studied here. This observation is in line with other work where participants can take actions which help or harm others, namely economic cooperation games (Everett et al 2017; Isler et al 2018; Rand 2016) . We conclude by suggesting that the Social Heuristic Hypothesis (Bear & Rand, 2016; Peysakhovich & Rand 2016; Rand et al 2014 Rand et al , 2016 , whereby typically advantageous behaviors are internalized as intuitive defaults, may help explain why -and when -honesty is intuitive versus deliberative.
Instructions of the Deception game (common to all participants)
Please read these instructions carefully. Your bonus depends on the decisions you make in the experiment.
You have been matched with another participant. Your bonus and that of the other participant depends only on your choice. The other participant does not play any active role.
There are two groups (group 1, group 2). You will be randomly assigned to one of them. The other participant will be assigned to the other one.
So, if you are assigned to group 1, then the other participant is assigned to group 2. Conversely, if you are assigned to group 2, then the other participant is assigned to group 1.
We will ask you to declare the group you have been assigned to. So you get to choose between two possible options:
Option 1: "I have been assigned to group 1." Option 2: "I have been assigned to group 2."
If you choose the option corresponding to the number of the actual group you have been assigned to, then you will receive 10c and the other participant will receive 10c.
If you choose the option corresponding to the number of the other group (the one you have not been assigned to), then you will receive 15c and the other participant will receive 5c.
The other participant is real and will really receive the amount corresponding to your choice.
Here are some questions to ascertain that you understand the rules. Remember that you have to answer all of these questions correctly in order to get the completion code. If you fail any of them, the survey will automatically end and you will not get any payment.
What is the choice that maximise YOUR outcome? (Available answers: Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the actual group you have been assigned to/ Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the other group (the one you have not been assigned to)).
What is the choice that maximise the OTHER PARTICIPANT'S outcome? (Available answers: Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the actual group you have been assigned to/ Choosing the message corresponding to the number of the other group (the one you have not been assigned to)).
Pressure_You_assigned_1 condition
YOU have been assigned to group 1.
RESPOND WITHIN 5 SECONDS
Which group have YOU been assigned to?
Pressure_You_assigned_2 condition
YOU have been assigned to group 2.
RESPOND WITHIN 5 SECONDS
Pressure_Other_assigned_1 condition
The OTHER PARTICIPANT has been assigned to group 1.
RESPOND WITHIN 5 SECONDS
Pressure_Other_assigned_2 condition
The OTHER PARTICIPANT has been assigned to group 2.
RESPOND WITHIN 5 SECONDS
Delay_You_assigned_1 condition
THINK CAREFULLY FOR AT LEAST 30 SECONDS BEFORE MAKING YOUR CHOICE
Delay_You_assigned_2 condition
THINK CAREFULLY FOR AT LEAST 30 SECONDS BEFORE MAKING YOUR CHOICE
Delay_Other_assigned_1 condition
THINK CAREFULLY FOR AT LEAST 30 SECONDS BEFORE MAKING YOUR CHOICE
Delay_Other_assigned_2 condition
THINK CAREFULLY FOR AT LEAST 30 SECONDS BEFORE MAKING YOUR CHOICE
